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LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
Turning and Turning in the widening gyre
The Falcon cannot hear the falconer
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold'
INTRODUCTION
One commentator has called disparate treatment law
"fundamentally incoherent." 2 A better description is incoherent and
impractical. Consider a 55-year-old African-American employee
who is fired after filing a complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he was denied a
promotion based on his race.3 This employee also has evidence that
the manager who fired him frequently made racist and ageist
comments. This individual has Title VII and Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) disparate treatment claims and a Title VII
retaliation claim.4  Under the current state of employment
discrimination law, this employee would have to prove each claim
Copyright 2011, by MARK R. DEETHARDT.
1. W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B.
YEATS 187 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1996).
2. The two types of employment discrimination claims are disparate
treatment (intentional discrimination) and disparate impact (unintentional
discrimination). The two claims are distinguished as follows:
Broadly speaking, it may be said that there are two generic forms of
employer conduct actionable under Title VII. First, there are a variety of
forms of intentional discrimination, "disparate treatment" . . . . More
controversial is employer liability for neutral, that is facially
nondiscriminatory, work practices that have greater adverse statistical
impact on members of the plaintiff s protected group ... than on others.
HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND PRACTICE 164-65 (2nd ed. 2004); see also Martin J. Katz, The
Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making Sense of Causation in Disparate
Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489 (2006).
3. Title VII's retaliation provision states that
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment
... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under this subchapter.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). The employee in this hypothetical is 55 because
an individual must be at least "40 years of age" to have a cognizable ADEA
disparate claim. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2006).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2006) (Title VII discrimination); 29 U.S.C. §
623 (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (ADEA disparate treatment); and 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3 (2006) (Title VII retaliation).
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using a different proof structure.5 The results of these conflicting
evidentiary structures are that the employee may have difficulty
pleading and determining how to prove his claims,6 the judge may
have trouble evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence and
instructing the jury on each method of proof, and the jury may
misunderstand the instructions and reach erroneous conclusions.
Furthermore, the current system for proving employment
discrimination prevents the employee from recovering damages for
some claims even if the jury finds that the employer intentionally
discriminated.7 A system riddled with such impracticalities is ill-
suited for achieving the lofty goal of employment discrimination
law, which is to place all employees on an ecual footing by deterring
discrimination and compensating its victims.
How plaintiffs prove disparate treatment claims under Title VII,
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the ADEA is one
of the most important concepts of employment discrimination law. 9
The proof structures that the Supreme Court has developed to guide
disparate treatment plaintiffs dictate every phase of litigation and are
an integral part of the law's overall scheme.' 0 These structures form
5. The term proof structure means the "paths for proving [employment]
discrimination set out by different Supreme Court opinions and statutes." Martin
J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 857 n.1 (2010).
6. Since 2007, the Supreme Court has heightened the pleading
requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by stating that a
complaint must allege enough factual matters to state a claim that is "plausible"
on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2009); Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Since the Court adopted these new
pleading standards, Title VII plaintiffs have had difficulty stating "plausible"
employment discrimination claims. See Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble With
Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination
Cases, U. ILL. L. REv. 1011 (2009) (analyzing distinct court dismissal rates of
employment discrimination claims in the year before and after Twombly and
finding that a greater percentage of cases were dismissed when courts cited the
new Supreme Court standards). When coupled with the various proof structures,
the heightened federal pleading requirements make asserting and proving
employment discrimination claims an arduous task.
7. See background infra Part III.A (discussing Serwatka).
8. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (1991). The first goal of Title VII
is to make whole the victims of discriminatory employment actions, and the
second goal is to deter future discriminatory acts.
9. The three major federal anti-discrimination employment statutes are
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7 (2006), the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
12117 (2006), and the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006 & Supp. II 2008).
10. William R. Corbett, Fixing Employment Discrimination Law, 62 SMU
L. REv. 81, 115 (2009) ("[The proof structures] are used to draft pleadings, to
conduct discovery, to move for summary judgment, to organize evidence for




the heart and soul of this vast body of law. If these proof structures
are so fundamental, why, then, are they so incoherent?
Proving disparate treatment claims under federal anti-
discrimination laws is such a vexing issue that Carter G. Phillips, a
seasoned Supreme Court advocate, stated, "I will say in 25 years of
advocacy before this Court I have not seen one area of the law that
seems to me as difficult to sort out as this particular one is."''
Sorting out these proof structures is so difficult because the
Supreme Court and lower courts have developed an amorphous
body of case law to define these structures' applicability to Title
VII, the ADEA, and the ADA. The Supreme Court has made these
structures all the more confusing by sometimes not providing clear
guidance and sometimes moving the law in unanticipated
directions.12 This free-wheeling jurisprudence makes sorting out
employment discrimination law a daunting task.
Commentators have developed various analogies to help sort
out the history of disparate treatment proof structures.,, Most
commentators, however, agree that this history has led the law to
the undesirable destinations of disrepair and disunity. The scholarly
consensus is that congressional reform is necessary to repair and
unify these proof structures.14
11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No. 08-441), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral argumenttranscripts/08-441.pdf. In addition to representing FBL Financial
in Gross, Carter G. Phillips has argued 66 other cases before the Supreme Court.
Mr. Phillips' 67 appearances before the Court are more than any lawyer
currently in private practice. SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/carter-
phillips/ (last visited June 11, 2011).
12. For an example of the Court not providing clear guidance, see
background infra Part II.B (discussing Desert Palace); for an example of the
Court moving the law in unanticipated directions, see background and
discussion infra Parts II.B, III.A (discussing Gross).
13. See Corbett, supra note 10, at 115-16 (analogizing disparate treatment
proof structures to a broken down car and Congress needing to repair the car by
giving it a new engine); William R. Corbett, Babbling About Employment
Discrimination Law: Does the Master Builder Understand the Blueprint for the
Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 683 (2010) [hereinafter Corbett, Babbling]
(analogizing Congress to an architect crafting a Title VII blueprint, with the
Supreme Court and federal courts acting as the subordinate builders who must
read the blueprint and create proof structures to define what "because of' a
protected characteristic means); Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment
(Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643, 645-52 (2008) (analogizing disparate treatment
jurisprudence to a swamp in which commentators and courts are bogged down).
14. See Corbett, supra note 10, at 82-83; Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at
693; Michael C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law:
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REv. 69, 144 (2010); Katz, supra note 2, at 491-
95; Katz, supra note 13; Katz, supra note 5; Jamie Darin Prenkert, The Role of
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This Comment conceptualizes the history of disparate
treatment law as marked by a sound center, followed by an
expanding gyre of amorphous jurisprudence that has moved the
law away from this center. The center of disparate treatment proof
structures is the dual burden-shifting frameworks, McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse (as modified by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991).15 A series of Supreme Court decisions culminating in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. has caused employment
discrimination law to spiral away from its center and the policy
goals embodied within it.16 Gross's holding-that a mixed-motives
jury instruction is never proper in an ADEA disparate treatment
case-has and will continue to have damaging consequences.' 7
Two post-Gross appellate court decisions-Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc. and Smith v. Xerox Corporation-illustrate
Gross's potential to expand and engulf other anti-discrimination
and anti-retaliation laws.' 8 Gross's most severe consequence is that
ADA and Title VII retaliation plaintiffs may soon be unable to
prove claims using a mixed-motives analysis.
Gross and its progeny will ultimately expand the gyre of
disparate treatment proof structures to the point where they will
become severed from their center. Serwatka and Smith serve as
windows through which to view Gross's pernicious consequences.
These two decisions, in different ways, illustrate the need for
Congress to wheel in this gyre and create a new center for
disparate treatment proof structures.
Congress' best option for creating this new center is the
Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act (POWAD
Act).19 Although this Act will overturn Gross, it is not flawless.20
In order to move employment discrimination law in a sensible
direction, Congress should pass an amended version of the Act. 21 if
Second-Order Uniformity in Disparate Treatment Law: McDonnell Douglas's
Longevity and the Mixed-Motives Mess, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 511, 559-60 (2008).
15. See background infra Part I.A.
16. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009). See background infra Part I.B.
17. 129 S. Ct. at 2352. A mixed motives case is one in which an employer is
motivated by both legitimate and illegitimate factors in making an adverse
employment decision. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231-35
(1989).
18. Serwatka, 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying Gross to the ADA);
Xerox, 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010) (considering, yet refusing, to apply Gross to
Title VII's retaliation provision).
19. H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 11-3721.
20. See discussion infra Part IV.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.
2011] 191
LOUISIANA LAW RE VIEW
Congress passes the Act without any fine-tuning, it will allow
employment discrimination law to continue marching out of step.
This Comment is divided into four parts. Part I traces the
history of disparate treatment proof structures from their origins in
McDonnell Douglas to their ultimate confusion in Gross. Part I
continues this history, providing a brief exposition of Serwatka and
Smith. Part III begins with a discussion of Gross's flaws and why
its effects are undesirable. Part III further discusses Serwatka and
Smith and how these two decisions are illustrative of Gross's
expansive nature. Before discussing congressional reform to create
a new center for disparate treatment proof structures, one must
understand why a mixed-motives structure is desirable. Part III
therefore analyzes the desirability of a unified mixed-motives
proof structure. Part IV concludes this Comment with a discussion
of the Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, its
beneficial and undesirable qualities, and the changes Congress
should consider before passing it as the new center for disparate
treatment proof structures.
I. THE CENTER AND THE GYRE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT PROOF
STRUCTURES
The history of proof structures for Title VII, ADEA, and ADA
disparate treatment claims is convoluted. There are, however,
several landmarks that one must visit in order to properly trace this
history. This section traces the history of disparate treatment proof
structures in two parts. The first part traces these structures' core
and developments through McDonnell Douglas, Price Waterhouse,
and the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The second part discusses the
structures' expansions via Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa and Gross.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the origin of the
22proof structures. In McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse,
the first two landmarks, the Supreme Court articulated two burden-
shifting frameworks that plaintiffs could use to bring Title VII
disparate treatment claims. 3 The next important landmark is the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII to incorporate a
modified version of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives structure
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000el7 (2006).
23. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). McDonnell Douglas and Price
Waterhouse specifically addressed characteristics-race and gender-prohibited
by Title VII, but this fact did not stop the Supreme Court and lower courts from
applying both proof structures to the ADEA, the ADA, and Title VII retaliation
claims. See Katz, supra note 13, at 668-69; Prenkert, supra note 14, at 547-56.
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directly into the statute.24 The final stopping points are two Supreme
Court cases that interpreted the 1991 Act. In Desert Palace and
Gross, the Court interpreted and restricted the 1991 Act in ways that
have confused courts and commentators as to which proof structure
is applicable under each anti-discrimination statute.25
A. The Center
In 1964 Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.2 6
This statute is the foundation of federal employment discrimination
law. By promulgating Title VII, "Congress made the simple but
momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national
origin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation
of employees."27 Title VII's operative provision states that it is
unlawful for an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
... because of' five protected characteristics-race, color, religion,
sex, and national origin.28 Congress, however, did not define the
term "because of' in the statute's definitions provision.29 The chore
of defining the phrase "because of' fell to the federal courts, which
devised proof structures designed to guide plaintiffs in bringing
disparate treatment claims and proving that an employer
intentionally discriminated based on a protected characteristic.
The Supreme Court, in attempting to define "because of,"
created two frameworks that form the core of employment
discrimination and retaliation claims. The Court created the first
disparate treatment proof structure-the pretext proof structure-in
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green.3 ' McDonnell Douglas
addressed what is and who bears the burden of proof in private, non-
class-action employment discrimination suits.3 The Court created a
three-part, burden-shifting structure to answer these two questions. 33
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
25. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(1)-2000e(2) (2006).
27. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
29. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (2003).
30. Prof. Corbett articulated this development by analogizing Congress to
an architect crafting a Title VII blueprint. The Supreme Court and federal courts,
however, are the builders who must read the blueprint and create the proof
structures that define what "because of' a protected characteristic means.
Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 683.
31. McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green 411 U.S. 792, 801-805 (1973).
32. Id. at 801.
33. Id. at 802-04.
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The first step of the McDonnell Douglas paradigm requires a
Title VII disparate treatment plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination.34 Once the plaintiff establishes his prima
facie case, he creates a leg lly mandatory, but rebuttable,
presumption of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the
defendant-employer to rebut this presumption by articulating a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.3 If
the employer can articulate a nondiscriminatory reason, the
employee then has an opportunity to demonstrate that the
articulated reason was a mere pretext given to disguise an
unlawful, discriminatory act.37
McDonnell Douglas remained the sole proof structure for Title
VII disparate treatment claims until the Court decided Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins in 1989.38 In this seminal decision, the
Court addressed the burdens of proof in a case where both
legitimate and illegitimate factors played a role in an adverse
employment decision.3 9  A plurality of the Court and two
concurring justices agreed that a mixed-motives proof structure 40
should be available to Title VII disparate treatment plaintiffs.4 1 The
plurality created a proof structure in which the plaintiff could shift
the burden of persuasion to the defendant by showing that a
protected factor played a motivating role in the adverse
employment decision. 2 Under the Price Waterhouse analysis,
34. Id. McDonnell Douglas laid out a five-part prima facie case for racial
discrimination. The Court, however, cautioned that the facts in each Title VII
claim would vary, and therefore, the prima facie case the Court laid out would
not be applicable to every Title VII claim. Id. at 802 n. 13.
35. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("The
prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the
most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.").
36. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court would later qualify
McDonnell Douglas' second step in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine. Burdine stated that the employer only bears the burden of producing a
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action and that the
ultimate burden of persuasion in the pretext analysis always remains with the
plaintiff. 450 U.S. at 253, 259.
37. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
38. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
39. Id. at 232.
40. The mixed-motives designation comes from the fact that Price
Waterhouse relied on both legitimate and illegitimate factors in its decision to
deny Ann Hopkins a promotion. Hopkins claimed she was denied partner status
because of "overtly sex-based comments of partners," and Price Waterhouse
claimed that it denied Hopkins a promotion due to her abrasive nature and lack
of interpersonal skills. Id. at 231-35.
41. Id. at 258; id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 258-61 (White,
J., concurring).
42. Id. at 244, 258.
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once the burden shifts to the defendant, the defendant can avoid
liability by proving that it would have made the same decision
even if it had not considered the prohibited factor.43
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, however, became the
controlling opinion." Justice O'Connor stated that in order for a
plaintiff to access the mixed-motives structure, the plaintiff would
have to "show by direct evidence an illegitimate criterion was a
substantial factor in the adverse employment decision."4 5 Justice
O'Connor's concurrence prompted a fair amount of scholarly
criticism. 46 But, at least after Price Waterhouse, a solidified pattern
for proving disparate treatment emerged: (1) if a plaintiff produced
direct evidence, then a court would hear the claim under Price
Waterhouse; and (2) if the plaintiff produced circumstantial
evidence, then a court would hear the claim under McDonnell
Douglas.
This relatively strong core began to erode when Congress
amended Title VII in 1991. Congress strongly disapproved of
Price Waterhouse's same-decision affirmative defense.48 The
House Judiciary Committee chastised the Court for "undercut[ing]
the prohibition against invidious discrimination, [and] threatening
to undermine Title VII's twin objectives of deterring employers
43. Id. at 258. The plurality referred to the defendant's burden in this analysis
as a same-decision affirmative defense. Id. at 246. The Price Waterhouse standard
of causation is best characterized as motivating-factor causation for burden-
shifting and but-for causation for liability. Katz, supra note 5, at 862.
44. See Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 743 (8th Cir. 2004)
(Magnuson, J., concurring specially) ("Since Price Waterhouse ... the analysis
appropriate at the summary judgment stage depended on the evidentiary
distinction made by Justice O'Connor."). See also Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?,
53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1910 (2004) ("Had Justice Brennan garnered a majority,
Price Waterhouse would have drastically expanded the possibilities for plaintiffs
to prove discrimination, even if the exact relationship between McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse was unclear. To construct a decision of the
Court, however, it was necessary to look to one of the concurring opinions.").
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
46. The major criticism of Justice O'Connor's concurrence is that she did
not define direct evidence and thereby caused appellate courts to split four ways
over a proper definition. See Katz, supra note 13, at 647.
47. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 703 ("[T]he pretext analysis
created by McDonnell Douglas and the mixed-motives analysis created by Price
Waterhouse were the twin pillars in disparate treatment litigation.").
48. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258. The Court defined the same-
decision affirmative defense as follows: "[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case
proves that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the
defendant may avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that it would have made the same decision even if it had not
taken the plaintiffs gender into account." Id.
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from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries suffered by
victims of discrimination."4 9 The Committee drove home its
disapproval by stating that the same-decision affirmative defense
sent "a message that a little overt sexism or racism is okay, as long
as it was not the only basis for the employer's action."50
Congress manifested its displeasure by enacting two
amendments to Title VII. First, Congress codified the mixed-
motives proof structure by writin 1 it into Title VII's unlawful
employment practices provision.' Second, to combat the
unwanted consequences of the same-decision affirmative defense,
Congress changed the defense from a complete bar on recovery to
a limitation on the damages plaintiffs could recover.52 With one
swipe, Congress overruled the applicability of Price Waterhouse's
same-decision affirmative defense to Title VII disparate treatment
claims. But, because of the lingering effects of Justice O'Connor's
direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line and the fact that there
were now three proof structures-McDonnell Douglas, Price
Waterhouse, and the 1991 Act-disparate treatment law began
spiraling away from its core.
After the 1991 Act, confusion ensued as to how plaintiffs were
supposed to bring claims under the various anti-discrimination
statutes. District courts tried Title VII disparate treatment claims
under the 1991 Act only if a plaintiff produced direct evidence.53
In cases where a plaintiff produced only circumstantial evidence
district courts continued to hear cases using McDonnell Douglas.54
Furthermore, even if courts used a burden-shifting framework to
analyze ADA and ADEA disparate treatment claims and Title VII
49. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (1991).
50. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 47 (1991).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) ("Except as otherwise provided in
this subchapter, an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.").
52. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B) (2006) ("On a claim in which an
individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a
respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action
in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may grant
declaratory relief, injunctive relief . . . and attorney's fees and costs ... [and] (ii)
shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).").
53. Katz, supra note 13, at 647-49.
54. Id. For the most succinct summation of the permutations of the proof
structures and their effect on federal anti-discrimination employment statutes,
see the tables in Prof. Katz's article Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really),
supra note 13, at 647, 649-50, 654.
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retaliation claims, they continued to apply the pre-1991
direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line.5
The 1991 Act, while well-intentioned, ultimately marked the
beginning of employment discrimination law's spiral away from its
center. As the Supreme Court continued to interpret the 1991 Act,
this center would begin to crack, and an expanding gyre would
move away from these burden-shifting foundations and the dual
policy goals of compensation and deterrence.
B. The Gyre-The Spiraling Out of Control of Disparate Treatment
Proof Structures
In 2003, the Court decided Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa. In
Desert Palace, the Court jettisoned Justice O'Connor's
direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line for Title VII disparate
treatment claims.57 Pointing to the 1991 Act's silence as to the
evidentiary requirements necessary to access the mixed-motives
structure, a unanimous Court reasoned that it should not deviate
from the general principles of civil litigation, which allow a
plaintiff to prove his claim through a preponderance of either direct
or circumstantial evidence.5 8 Given the difficulty in obtaining
direct evidence of an employer's discriminatory intent, the Court's
holding was encouraging for potential Title VII disparate treatment
claimants.59
The Court did not cause confusion by what it said, but rather
by what it failed to say. In a footnote, the Court stated that the case
did not require a ruling on whether its holding applied to claims
outside of the 1991 Act's framework.6 0 By remaining tacit, the
Court left two questions unanswered. First, in the absence of a
direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line, when, if ever, is the
McDonnell Douglas framework applicable? And second, does the
55. Id. at 648-49.
56. 539 U.S. 90.
57. Id. at 101 (holding, "In order to obtain an instruction under § 2000e-
3(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or
nation origin' was a motivating factor for any employment practice.").
58. Id. at 99.
59. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("[D]irect evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by."); Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 702 ("Generally, Desert Palace moved
the law in a positive direction for employees/plaintiffs under Title VII .... ).
60. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94 n.1 ("This case does not require us to
decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-motives context.").
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dissolution of the direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line have
applicability outside of the 1991 Act framework? 61
Desert Palace's silence put lower courts in a precarious position.
Lower courts had to ask whether there were two or three proof
structures and when these structures applied.62 Ultimately, Desert
Palace left lower courts with no guidance to help claw their way out
of this pit.63 The lower courts could not heed the directions of the
Supreme Court, because the Court refused to direct.64
Desert Palace furthered employment discrimination law's
movement away from a relatively simple core of dual burden-
shifting paradigms. The outward movement caused by Desert
Palace began a period of uncertainty in employment discrimination
law that continues today. 65 The fundamental question of how
plaintiffs prove disparate treatment claims has now become
undecipherable and unanswerable.
This trend of the law moving away from its foundations
reached an apex in 2009 when a divided Court decided Gross v.
FBL Financial Services, Inc.66 In Gross, the Court granted
certiorari to address whether, in the aftermath of Desert Palace, the
direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line was still applicable to
61. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 701. Some courts, however,
applied Desert Palace's dissolution of the direct/circumstantial evidence
dividing line to statutes-the ADA, the ADEA, and anti-retaliation provisions-
other than the 1991 Act. For an exhaustive list of cases that applied Desert
Palace outside of the 1991 Act framework see Katz, supra note 13, at 650 n. 30.
62. Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 706. After Desert Palace, appellate
courts were left to ponder whether to apply only Price Waterhouse and the 1991
Act framework or whether to apply these two frameworks plus McDonnell
Douglas to disparate treatment claims.
63. Corbett, supra note 10, at 99.
64. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Rachid v. Jack in the Box is paradigmatic
of the dilemma of lower courts post-Desert Palace. 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir.
2004). The Fifth Circuit, left with only its ingenuity, articulated a modified
McDonnell Douglas approach in which it fused the pretext and mixed-motives
proof structures into one analysis. Id. at 312. Rachid articulated this hybrid test
in an ADEA disparate treatment case. Id. at 308. The first two phases of this
unified structure followed McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 312. At the third phase,
however, the plaintiff could exercise two options: (1) show that the employer's
proffered reason was a mere pretext for covering up a discriminatory act; or (2)
show that the employer's proffered reason, while true, was only a motivating
factor that worked in conjunction with a prohibited factor. Id. Rachid is
illustrative of the post-Desert Palace landscape, in which lower courts were left
to their own devices in applying the various proof structures to different anti-
discrimination statutes.
65. See generally Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13; Corbett, supra note 10;
Katz, supra note 13; and Katz, supra note 5.
66. 129 S. Ct. 2343.
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ADEA disparate treatment claims. Many observers justifiably
thought that Gross would be Desert Palace II.68 69
The Court, however, answered a much broader question. The
majority held a mixed-motives framework is never applicable in
ADEA disparate treatment cases. 70 Instead, an ADEA disparate
treatment plaintiff must prove his claim by showing that age was
the but-for cause of the challenged employment action. Justice
Thomas based the majority's holding on three arguments: (1) a
limited amendment argument, which stated that Congress had the
opportunity to amend the ADEA in 1991 to include a mixed-
motive framework but failed to do so; 72 (2) an argument that the
phrase "because of," in its ordinary use, means "but-for" causation;
and (3) an argument that the Price Waterhouse analysis 73is
doctrinally unsound, difficult to apply, and should be discarded.
Justice Stevens, in a forceful dissent, countered the majority by
attacking the plain language argument, stating that "because of' is
not "colloquial short-hand for but-for causation."74 Justice Stevens'
most cogent counterargument was the fact that the majority's
definition of "because of' stood in direct contrast to the Price
Waterhouse and 1991 Act definitions, both of which defined
"because of' as including motivating-factor causation.75
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent, emphasized the difference
between standards of causation in the context of tort and
employment discrimination law, and the inappropriateness of but-for
67. Id. at 2346 ("The question presented by petitioner in this case is whether
a plaintiff must present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain a
mixed motives jury instruction in a suit brought under the . .. [ADEA].").
68. Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 702.
69. See infra note 108.
70. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2349. Using the limited amendment argument, the Court presumed
that Congress acted intentionally in its failure to simultaneously amend Title VII
and the ADEA. This intentional difference, the Court reasoned, indicated a
different standard of causation under each of the statutes. Id.
73. Id. at 2349-52.
74. Id. at 2354 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens rightfully
characterized the majority's holding as "an unabashed display of judicial
lawmaking." Id. at 2358.
75. Id. at 2358 ("The Court's endorsement of a different construction of the
same critical language in the ADEA and Title VII is both unwise and
inconsistent with settled law. The but-for standard the Court adopts was rejected
by this Court in Price Waterhouse and by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Yet today, the Court resurrects the standard in an unabashed display of
judicial lawmaking.").
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causation in the latter.76 Both dissents highlight the fact that, from
the beginning, the majority's reasoning was riddled with flaws.
The Gross Court caused the proof structures to spiral further
away from their burden-shifting center. In the aftermath of Gross,
one can only be certain that a mixed-motives analysis is applicable
to disparate treatment claims brought under the 1991 Act.
Unfortunately, Gross's limited amendment argument has broad
applicability. Lower courts have used and potentially will use
Gross's reasoning to further fragment disparate treatment proof
structures.
II. THE AFTERMATH OF GROSS AND THE WIDENING GYRE
Since Gross, two appellate courts have decided cases that take
divergent paths in interpreting the decision.7 7 These two appellate
court decisions could have a significant impact on the way lower
courts may or may not apply Gross to employment discrimination
statutes outside of the ADEA.78
A. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc.: Gross and the ADA
In 2010, the Seventh Circuit decided Serwatka v. Rockwell
Automation, Inc. 9 In Serwatka, an employee, Kathleen Serwatka,
brought an ADA disparate treatment claim, alleging that her
employer Rockwell Automation fired her because it perceived her
as disabled.80 The district court allowed Serwatka to assert her
claim using the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives framework.8 ' A
jury found that Rockwell partially based its decision to terminate
Serwatka on a perceived disability. 82 Using the Price Waterhouse
analysis, however, the jury concluded that Rockwell would have
fired Serwatka even if Rockwell had not considered the perceived
76. Id. at 2358-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("But it is an entirely different
matter to determine a 'but-for' relation when we consider, not physical forces,
but the mind-related characterizations that constitute motive.").
77. Compare Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962
(7th Cir. 2010) (holding that Gross's construction of "because of' as but-for
causation under the ADEA is applicable to the ADA) with Smith v. Xerox
Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2010) (declining to apply Gross to Title
VII retaliation claims and stating that "the Price Waterhouse holding remains
our guiding light.").
78. See discussion infra Parts III.B, III.C.
79. 591 F.3d 957.
80. Id. at 958.
81. Id. at 958-59.
82. Id. at 960.
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disability. 83 Therefore, the district court determined that Serwatka
was only entitled to the limited damages provided by § 2000e(5)-
declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys fees.
On appeal, Rockwell argued that a mixed-motives analysis is
inapplicable to the ADA. The Seventh Circuit therefore had to
decide whether Gross's holding encompassed ADA disparate
treatment claims.8 6 The Serwatka court answered this question
with an emphatic "yes," holding that, under Gross, a mixed-
motives theory of causation is never applicable to ADA disparate
treatment claims.
The Serwatka court fully embraced Gross's limited amendment
argument to hold that the phrase "because of' in the ADA, like the
phrase "because of' in the ADEA, necessitates a but-for standard
of causation. Therefore, in order for an ADA disparate treatment
plaintiff to succeed, he must show that the forbidden
characteristic-in this case, the perceived disability-was the but-
for cause of the adverse employment action.89 The court stated that
because Serwatka could not show the perceived disability was the
but-for cause of Rockwell's employment decision, she was not
entitled to relief under the ADA.90 Even though a jury found that
Rockwell discriminated based on a perceived disability, Kathleen
Serwatka, like Jack Gross, could not recover any damages due to
the court's rigid application of a but-for standard of causation.
B. Smith v. Xerox: Gross and Title VII Retaliation
In 2010, Gross reared its head again, but this time the Fifth
Circuit determined whether to apply the limited amendment
argument to Title VII's retaliation provision.91 In Smith v. Xerox,
the Fifth Circuit addressed two separate questions. The first
question was whether the Desert Palace holding was applicable to
83. Id.
84. Id. The enforcement provision of the ADA states that the remedies
available to an ADA plaintiff are the same as the remedies provided by 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5 (Title VI's enforcement provision). 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006).
85. Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 960.
86. Id. at 959.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 961-62.
89. Id. The ADA's operative provision states that "[n]o covered entity shall
discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees,
employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a) (2006).
90. Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 963.
91. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 322-23 (5th Cir. 2010).
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Title VII retaliation claims, and the second question was whether,
after Gross, a mixed-motives framework was even still applicable
to these claims. 92 In response to the first question, the Smith court
found that Desert Palace was applicable to Title VII retaliation
claims and erased the direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line
that was previously applicable to them.93 In response to whether
Gross's holding was broad enough to engulf Title VII's retaliation
provision, the court found that Gross was limited to the ADEA and
did not overrule prior Fifth Circuit precedent applying Price
Waterhouse to Title VII retaliation claims.94 The Smith decision
could have caused the gyre of disparate treatment jurisprudence to
spiral further out of control. Fortunately, the Fifth Circuit drew a
line in the sand and refused to expand the holding of Gross.
In holding that Gross was inapplicable to Title VII retaliation
claims, the Smith court was inventive in its reasoning. The court
stated that if Gross was premised on an aversion to intermingling
statutory schemes, then extending Gross to retaliation claims and
further intermingling the schemes of Title VII and the ADEA
would be contrary to this "admonition against intermingling." 95
The Smith court further reasoned that because the Supreme Court
never overruled Price Waterhouse, it would not, as an inferior
court, overturn Price Waterhouse's previous application to Title
VII retaliation claims.9 6 The court emphasized that Gross did not
overrule Fifth Circuit precedent applying Price Waterhouse to
Title VII's retaliation provision.97 The Fifth Circuit, in the absence
of an express overruling of Price Waterhouse, refused to overturn
its precedents.98
Smith, however, contained a forceful dissent.99 The dissent
lamented the majority's creation of a split with the Seventh
92. Id. at 329, 332.
93. Id. at 332 ("[T]o the extent we have previously required direct evidence
of retaliation in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a Title VII
case, our decisions have been necessarily overruled by Desert Palace. Smith
therefore was not required to present direct evidence of retaliation in order to
receive a mixed-motives jury instruction.").
94. Id. at 329-30 ("[T]he Price Waterhouse holding remains our guiding
light. Although the dissent would extend Gross into the Title VII context, we
think that would be contrary to Gross's admonition against intermingling
interpretations of the two statutory schemes.").
95. Id at 329.
96. Id. at 330 n.30 (citing Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson, 490 U.S. 477,
484 (1989)).
97. Id at 330.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 336 (Jolly, J., dissenting).
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Circuit. 00 The dissent adopted Gross's plain language and limited
amendment arguments. 0 ' Pointing to the fact that Title VII's
retaliation provision has the same "because of' language that
Gross defined as but-for causation, the dissent argued that Title
VII retaliation plaintiffs should have to prove but-for causation in
order to prevail. 102 The dissent also embraced the limited
amendment argument, stating that the "'carefully tailored'
amendments made to Title VII in 1991 should be read as limiting
the mixed-motives analysis to the statutory provision under which
it was codified ... Title VII discrimination only."' 0 3
The Smith dissent took Gross to its logical extreme. By adopting
the Seventh Circuit's position that Gross holds but-for causation is
part of a plaintiffs burden under all federal statutes not providing
otherwise, the dissent articulated the most expansive interpretation
of Gross. 04 This interpretation translates into a bar on mixed-
motives in all non-Title VII disparate treatment claims. The Smith
dissent clearly embraced this total bar on mixed-motives: "[T]he
'because of language requires a plaintiff to demonstrate but-for
causation. This is the standard that claimants under Title VII's
retaliation provision must meet in the post-Gross world."' 05
III. REELING IN THE GYRE: THE PRACTICAL AND THEORETICAL
REASONS FOR A NEW CENTER
Gross and its progeny have the potential to expand the gyre of
employment discrimination law to the point where it becomes
severed from its foundation. In differing ways, Serwatka and Smith
illustrate the need for congressional reform. Due to Gross's
expansion within employment discrimination law, Congress needs
to reel this area of the law back in and create a new center for
disparate treatment claims.
A. Gross v. FBL Financial Services: A Woeful Decision
Before one can understand why the spread of Gross is
undesirable, one must first understand why Gross's holding is
undesirable. The criticisms of Gross are myriad and come from
100. Id.
101. Id. at 336-37.
102. Id. at 336.
103. Id. at 338.
104. Id. at 337 (citing Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957,
961 (7th Cir. 2010) and Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir.
2009)).
105. Id. at 338.
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many sources. Several commentators have dissected Gross's flaws,
and House members have proposed legislation to overturn it.106 So
far, Gross has not pushed employment discrimination law in a
desirable direction. Rather, this woeful decision has created
uncertainty and jeopardized the policy goals of employment
discrimination law.
1. Flaws in Gross's Reasoning'os
The major flaw in Gross's reasoning-particularly with respect
to its different construction of the same "because of' language in
Title VII and the ADEA-is that it violates a fundamental canon of
106. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13; Harper, supra note 14; Katz,
supra note 5; Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721,
111th Cong. § 2(a)(3) (1st Sess. 2009), available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl 11-3721 ("Congress has relied on a long line of
court cases holding that language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, and similar anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation laws, that is nearly
identical to language in title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would be
interpreted consistently with judicial interpretations of title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, including amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. The Supreme Court's decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), has eroded this long-held understanding of consistent
interpretation and circumvented well-established precedents.").
107. See generally Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13; Harper, supra note 14;
Katz, supra note 5.
108. An obvious criticism of Gross, though it falls outside the scope of this
Comment, is that the Court answered a different question than the one for which
it granted certiorari. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Jack Gross asked the Court to address whether Desert
Palace's holding was applicable to ADEA disparate treatment claims. Id. at
2346. The Court, instead of answering this specific question, held that not only
is Desert Palace inapposite in ADEA disparate treatment claims, but the entire
mixed-motives framework is also inapposite. Id. at 2349.
FBL Financial Services first asked the Court to overrule Price Waterhouse
with respect to the ADEA in its merits brief Brief for Respondent at 26, Gross
v. FBL Fin. Serv., 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009) (No. 08-441).
The Court, however, has previously stated that when a respondent intends to
argue for dramatic changes in the law, the respondent should give notice of such
arguments in its opposition to certiorari. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654,
660 n.3 (2002). The purpose of requiring a respondent to assert such arguments
in its opposition to certiorari is to give adequate time for the petitioner and
potential amici curiae to prepare informed responses. Id. Justice Stevens
lamented the fact that by addressing FBL's argument, the Court answered a
question that neither Gross nor his amici curiae had briefed. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at
2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The fact that the Court chose to answer a question
that was not presented in the petition for certiorari reveals an underlying flaw of
the decision, which is that Gross and his amici were not given fair notice of the
fundamental issue the Court intended to resolve.
statutory interpretation, the unification canon.1os This canon is
grounded in the presumption that when Congress uses a phrase, such
as "because of," in an earlier statute-Title VII-and then uses the
same phrase in a later statute-the ADEA-it intends the phrase to
have the same meaning." 0 The unification canon's guiding principle
is that when Congress borrows language from one statute to draft
another statute, courts should interpret the similar language of the
two statutes consistently."' The Court has endorsed this canon in
dicta, stating that similarity in the language of two statutes "is ... [a]
strong indication that the two statutes should be interpreted pari
passu. Justice Stevens' dissent further echoed this principle,
stating that the majority's different interpretation of the same critical
language in two statutes was "unwise." 3
Why then did Gross deviate from this canon and interpret
"because of' in Title VII and the ADEA differently? This question
is more perplexing given the fact that Price Waterhouse did not
define "because of' as requiring a Title VII plaintiff to prove but-for
causation, but rather as requiring a plaintiff to show that a protected
characteristic motivated the employer's adverse action."14
Moreover, the parties in Gross were not fighting over whether
the 1991 Act definition applied to the ADEA, but rather whether
the Price Waterhouse definition applied.'" 5 After the passage of the
1991 Act, courts generally applied the Price Waterhouse
framework to non-1991 Act cases. 6 Because the parties in Gross
were fighting over the 1964 meaning of "because of' under Title
VII and the 1967 meaning of "because of' under the ADEA,
Congress' intent in the 1991 Act should have been irrelevant to the
outcome of the case. 17 Price Waterhouse clearly did not define
109. See Katz, supra note 5, at 866. When one compares Title VII and the
ADEA, one can readily see that the "because of' language in the two statutes is
identical. Title VII states that it unlawful for an employer to take certain adverse
employment actions "because of... [an] individual's race, color religion, sex or
nation origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). The ADEA
states that it is unlawful for an employer to take certain adverse employment
actions "because of . .. [an] individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)
(emphasis added).
110. Katz, supra note 5, at 868.
111. Jamie Darin Prenkert, Bizarro Statutory Stare Decisis, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 217, 234-35 (2007).
112. Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973).
113. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
115. Katz, supra note 5, at 870.
116. See background supra Part I.A.
117. Katz, supra note 5, at 870.
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"because of' as but-for causation."' Gross, therefore, ignored a
widely accepted canon of statutory interpretation with no
justification for doing so.1 19
Two other criticisms of Gross are the Court's use of the
ordinary meaning argument and its insistence that the Price
Waterhouse framework is unworkable.120 The Gross Court looked
to several dictionaries and a canonical torts treatise to conclude
that "because of' means that the plaintiffs age was the but-for
cause of the adverse employment action.' 2 1 The Gross Court's
definition of "because of' is problematic for two reasons. The first
reason is that people do not use "because of' and "but-for"
interchangeably in everyday speech. Justice Stevens noted this
point, stating that we do not think of the phrase "because of' as
being "colloquial short-hand for but-for causation."' 22 When one
says an event occurred "because of' a certain factor, one may be
referring to the most substantial causal factor, but one also
implicitly realizes that many other factors contributed to causing
the event.
The Senate debates on Title VII further illustrate the absurdity
of defining "because of' as but-for causation.123 In response to
Senator McClellan's proposal to define Title VII violations as
occurring only when a prohibited factor was the sole motivation
for an adverse employment action, Senator Case stated, "If anyone
ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a
different kind of animal from any I know of."' " Senator Case's
statement highlights a fundamental truth about causation that the
Gross Court failed to acknowledge, which is that, especially in the
subjective context of employment discrimination, many factors
play a role in an adverse employment decision.
The second problem with Gross's definition of "because of' is
that while it is well-suited for tort law, it is ill-suited for
employment discrimination law.125 In tort law, which deals with
physical forces-a car smashing into another car or a fist smashing
118. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
119. Katz, supra note 5, at 871.
120. Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350, 2352 (2009).
121. Id. at 2350 (citing 1 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 194 (1966); 1 OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 746 (1933); THE
RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 132 (1966); and W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF
TORTS 265 (5th ed. 1984)).
122. Id. at 2354 n.4 (Steven, J., dissenting).
123. 110CONG.REc. 13,837-38 (1964).
124. Id.
125. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358-59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
206 [Vol. 72
into a face-but-for causation is established through the obective,
scientific process of eliminating all other possible causes. In the
contrasting context of employment discrimination law, one is not
eliminating possible physical causes, but rather, one is searching
for "the mind-related characterizations that constitute motive."I
A subjective motive, which works in concert with a host of other
motives, is much more difficult to pinpoint than an objective
physical action as the sole cause of an event.128 This difficulty
arises from the fact that individuals can perceive objective,
physical events, whereas evidence of an employer's subjective
motives is often locked within the confines of the employer's mind
and inaccessible to an inquisitive plaintiff. Therefore, requiring an
ADEA disparate treatment plaintiff to pinpoint age as the sole
motive of an adverse employment action is nearly impossible and
antithetical to the subjective nature of discriminatory employment
actions.
The Gross Court further argued that Price Waterhouse should
not apply to the ADEA because of the supposed practical
difficulties in its application. 129 The Court, however, did not
support this assertion with any actual examples of these
difficulties.130 By refusing to extend Price Waterhouse to ADEA
disparate treatment claims, Gross created, rather than alleviated,
practical difficulties in the application of the law. The practical
effect of having two different standards of causation for Title VII
and ADEA disparate treatment claims is to confuse judes,
practitioners, and juries when plaintiffs assert multiple claims.
2. Flaws in the Practical Application of Gross
The preceding points illustrate the flaws in Gross's reasoning,
but Gross is also undesirable because of its practical effects. Gross's
holding has caused several undesirable consequences that threaten
the underlying policy goals of employment discrimination law.
Title VII's dual policy goals are "deterring employers from
discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries suffered by
victims of discrimination." 32 These policy goals underlie and
inform the ADEA as well.133 Gross's first practical consequence is
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Harper, supra note 14, at 84.
129. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see introduction supra.
132. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 13 (1991).
133. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995).
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that it jeopardizes the goal of victim compensation. Gross, by
defining "because of' as but-for causation, created a standard that
allows discriminators to avoid liability more easily. 134 Under the
Gross standard, an employer can avoid liability as long as it can
articulate some independently sufficient reason for the adverse
employment decision. 35 This standard is problematic because it
provides would-be age discriminators with a shield from liability.
Gross's strict standard thus thwarts the ADEA's underlying policy
goal of victim compensation.
Gross's second practical consequence is that a but-for standard
of causation insufficiently deters age discrimination.136 If an
employer knows that it can avoid liability by pointing to some
independently sufficient reason-tardiness, failure to comply with
company policies, insubordination-for an adverse employment
action, then the employer will be less likely to second-guess taking
an action that is based partially on age. Allowing employers to
escape liability when making a decision based on both legitimate
and illegitimate factors "sends a message that a little overt sexism
or racism [or ageism] is oka , as long as it was not the only basis
for the employer's action."l3
Gross's holding also unfairly allocates a windfall to the
defendant-employer.138 The but-for standard of causation puts the
defendant-employer in a better position than it would have been
absent a second, legitimate factor for the adverse employment
action.139 The Gross standard lets the defendant-employer avoid
all liability if it can articulate a legitimate reason, whereas the 1991
Act standard holds the defendant-employer liable for some
damages even if it can articulate a legitimate reason.140 Gross, by
134. Katz, supra note 5, at 880, 884.
135. Id. at 884.
136. Id.
137. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 43 (1991).
138. Katz, supra note 5, at 887.
139. Id.
140. Compare Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009),
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). Prof. Katz uses Gross's fact pattern to
illustrate how a but-for standard in disparate treatment cases allocates a windfall
to the defendant-employer:
Suppose that a defendant considers age in its decision to demote the
plaintiff (as Jack Gross alleged FBL did). And suppose that
consideration of age alone would have resulted in the decision to
demote. Absent a second, independent factor, the defendant would be
liable and have to pay the plaintiff for the cost of his demotion. But
suppose that the defendant were presented with a second,
independently sufficient reason for its decision (such as corporate
restructuring, as alleged by FBL). In such a case, a but-for standard
would result in no liability-in a windfall for the defendant.
208 [ Vol. 72
allowing the defendant-employer to escape all liability even when
it is partially at fault, is antithetical to another general goal of the
law, which is to prevent a windfall to either party.14 1
Letting discriminators get away with discrimination, under-
deterring discrimination, and unfairly allocating windfalls to
defendant-employers are Gross's practical, microscopic
consequences. Gross, however, has made a serious macroscopic
impact on the overall shape of disparate treatment litigation.
Gross's overarching effect is that it has exacerbated the state of
confusion surrounding disparate treatment law.142 Confusion and
disarray in employment discrimination law are undesirable because
they make the law more difficult to understand and create a sense
of public distrust in the entire scheme. 143
In order to avoid confusion and public distrust in a scheme that
protects one class of people more than another, Congress must
stem the tide of Gross. Unfortunately, Congress has not yet acted.
Currently, Gross and its ill effects have spread to the ADA and are
threatening to spread to Title VII's retaliation provision. If Gross's
spread is to be halted, then Congress must act swiftly and overturn
this decision.
B. The Scope and Effects of Serwatka and Smith
1. Serwatka: The Gyre Expands to Encompass the ADA
Gross's flawed reasoning and ill effects are currently spreading
to other anti-discrimination laws, specifically the ADA. Serwatka,
in interpreting the ADA as necessitating a but-for standard of
causation, took Gross one step further.'" Serwatka ultimately took
Gross to its logical extreme, stating that a mixed-motives
Katz, supra note 5, at 886.
141. Katz, supra note 5, at 888 ("If the goal of the law is to minimize
windfall to one party, the simple . . . but-for standard adopted by Gross is not as
good as the . . . sufficiency standard with damages apportionment used in
modem tort law-the area of the law Gross purports to use as a model.").
142. One could argue that the Court did not create confusion and uncertainty
because it established a clear but-for standard of causation for ADEA disparate
treatment claims. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352. This assertion, while true, overlooks
the implicit confusion of Gross's holding. The Gross Court created confusion
and uncertainty not through its explicit holding but rather through its alteration
of long-practiced applications of the mixed-motives analysis and through
uncertainty as to the scope of its holding.
143. Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 691-92.




framework is never applicable under any anti-discrimination
statute without express, con essional incorporation of such a
framework within the statute.
One can hardly fault the Serwatka court for reaching its
conclusion. Although the court articulated an uncritical parroting
of Gross's limited amendment argument, the Supreme Court's
supervisory jurisdiction dictates that federal appellate courts follow
binding precedent.146 While doctrine dictated that Serwatka follow
Gross, the case nevertheless is illustrative of the limited
amendment argument's expansive scope. Serwatka illustrates how
easily Gross can affect other anti-discrimination statues.
Ultimately, Serwatka elevates the spiraling of employment
discrimination law to more extreme heights.
After Serwatka, courts within the Seventh Circuit have adhered
to the misguided notion that a mixed-motives analysis is always
improper in suits brought under anti-discrimination laws without a
provision comparable to the Civil Rights Act of 1991.14
Serwatka's most harmful consequence is that, like Gross, its
145. Id. at 961; See also background supra Part II.A.
146. See Hopwood v. State of Tex., 84 F.3d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1996) (Politz,
C.J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing en banc) ("The Supreme Court has
left no doubt that as a constitutionally inferior court, we are compelled to follow
faithfully a directly controlling Supreme Court precedent unless and until the
Supreme Court itself determines to overrule it. We may not reject, dismiss,
disregard or deny Supreme Court precedent, even if, in a particular case, it
seems pellucidly clear to litigants, lawyers, and lower court judges alike that,
given the opportunity, the Supreme Court would overrule its precedent.").
147. See Hung Nam Tran v. Kriz, No. 09-4132, 2010 WL 1811741, slip op.
at 2 (7th Cir. May 6, 2010) (holding that the district court properly dismissed an
ADA disparate treatment claim on summary judgment because the appellant
never proved that he suffered mistreatment because of his disability); Serafinn v.
Local 722, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 597 F.3d 908, 915 (7th Cir.
2010) (citing Serwatka: "Mixed-motives theories of liability are always
improper in suits brought under statutes without language comparable to the
Civil Rights Act's authorization of claims that an improper consideration was a
'motivating factor' for the contested action."); Lougheed v. Village of
Mundelein, No. 09 C 1683, 2010 WL 2836973, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ill. July 19,
2010) (citing Serwatka's holding); Canon-Stokes v. Potter, No. 07 C 6283, 2010
WL 2166806, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. May 27, 2010) (citing Serwatka's holding);
Matthews v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:08-CV-37-PRC, 2010 WL 2076814, slip
op. at 10 n.2 (N.D. Ind. May 24, 2010) (stating Serwatka is applicable to ADA
disparate treatment claims even with recent congressional amendments to the
ADA.); Gray v. Keystone Steel and Wire Co., No. 08-1197, 2010 WL 1849803,
slip op. at 5 (C.D. Ill. May 7, 2010) (". . . [T]he ADA does not permit mixed
motives cases."); Basset v. Potter, No. 07-1172, 2010 WL 914412, slip op. at 13
(C.D. Ill. March 10, 2010) (". . . [T]his Court is obliged to follow Serwatka. This
case does not even approach but-for causation.").
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holding has and may continue to spread to other circuits.148
Therefore, at worst, Serwatka's holding will deny ADA disparate
treatment plaintiffs access to a mixed-motives framework. At best,
not all circuits will adopt Serwatka, and there will be a circuit split.
In either case, Serwatka threatens to further disorient the law of
disparate treatment proof structures.
The ADA and Title VII do, however, have different origins,
and some courts have pointed to this fact to argIue that the ADA
does necessitate a but-for standard of causation. 49 The argument
that the ADA's standard of causation should be different than Title
VII's standard of causation stems from the fact that the ADA is a
hybrid statute, borrowing its main provisions from both the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and Title VII.'so The Rehabilitation Act
requires a plaintiff to show that his disabilit was the sole factor
motivating an employer's adverse decision.' 5 Some courts cling to
the Rehabilitation Act to argue that an ADA disparate treatment
plaintiff must show that his disability was the sole cause of an
adverse employment decision.152
Another facet of the ADA that potentially makes it
incompatible with a mixed-motives framework is the statute's
direct threat defense.153 This defense states that an employer can
set qualification standards for employing individuals, which "may
include that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health
148. See Ross v. Indep. Living Resource of Contra Costa Cnty., No. C08-
00854 TEH, 2010 WL 2898773, slip op. at 6 (N.D. Cal. July 21, 2010) (citing
Serwatka and using a limited amendment argument to deny a mixed-motives
theory of causation under the ADA in the 9th Circuit); Warshaw v. Concentra
Health Serv., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 502-03 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (citing Serwatka and
Gross to deny a mixed-motives theory of causation to the anti-retaliation
provision of the ADA in the Third Circuit).
149. See Prenkart, supra note 14, at 552-54.
150. Id. at 552 ("[T]he ADA's definition of disability is patterned after the
Rehabilitation Act's definition, the ADA . .. incorporates Title VII's enforcement
provisions. Therefore, the interpretation and application of both of those
predecessor statutes has been used to inform and guide ADA jurisprudence.").
Congress amended the ADA in 2009. Prior to 2009, § 12112(a) stated, "No
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual because of
disability. . . ." Congress borrowed this "because of' language directly from Title
VII. Now, however, the ADA states, "No covered entity shall discriminate against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability. . . ." See 29 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2006) (emphasis added); ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, §
3406, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 (2008).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2006).
152. Prenkart, supra note 14, at 553 ("[S]ome courts relied on the ADA's
Rehabilitation Act heritage to incorporate a sole cause requirement into the
ADA. Clearly, if a sole cause requirement is read into the ADA, that statute can
give rise to no mixed-motives claims.").
153. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (2006).
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or safety of other individuals in the workplace."l 54 This defense
allows employers, in certain circumstances, to use an individual's
disability as a motivating factor for making an adverse
employment decision. By allowing employers to make decisions
based on disability status, the direct threat defense makes the
mixed-motives framework "seem incompatible with the ADA." 55
Therefore, the ADA's direct threat defense, coupled with its
Rehabilitation Act heritage, could lead one to conclude that the
statute does not support a mixed-motives analysis.
There are, however, strong counterarguments to the assertion
that the ADA is incompatible with a mixed-motives framework.
The first counterargument is that Congress amended the ADA in
2008.156 Congress's most pertinent amendment for the purpose of
defining a standard of causation under the ADA was its alteration
of the phrase "because of' in §§ 12112(a) and (b) to "on the basis
of."1 7 While "because of' means "by reason of," "basis" means
the "underlying support for an idea, argument, or process."' 5 8
Congress's shift in language, though it preceded Gross, signals an
implicit disapproval of a but-for standard of liability for ADA
disparate treatment claims. After these 2008 amendments, one
could no longer point to the canon of uniformity to link Title VII's
"because of' language to the ADA. One could, however, point to
these amendments as an indication that Congress wished to align
the ADA with a phrase-"on the basis of'-that more clearly
signaled a mixed-motives analysis.
Title VII, like the ADA, also has a defense provision that
allows employers to intentionally use prohibited factors as a basis
for making adverse employment decisions.159 Title VII's bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense undercuts the argument
that the ADA's direct threat defense restricts the application of a
mixed-motives framework to the ADA. The BFOQ defense states
that "it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees" when religion, sex, or
national origin is a BFOQ necessary for the normal performance of
a job.'60 If the 1991 Act allows Title VII discrimination plaintiffs
154. Id.
155. Prenkart, supra note 14, at 553.
156. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 3406, 122 Stat.
3553 (2008).
157. Id. at 3557.
158. CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 112, 119 (11th ed. 2004).
159. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
160. Id This defense does not extend to race or color, and under Title VII, an
employer is categorically prohibited from intentionally discriminating on the
basis of these two categories. Id.
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to use a mixed-motives framework despite the BFOQ defense, then
one should not use the ADA's direct threat defense as an argument
against allowing ADA plaintiffs access to a mixed-motives
analysis.
A final argument for treating the ADA and Title VII similarly
is that discrimination based on a disability is more analogous to the
types of discrimination protected by Title VII than age
discrimination. Congress and the Supreme Court have
distinguished age discrimination from race and gender
discrimination by stating the former is based on inaccurate
stereotypes about older workers' abilities, whereas the latter is
based on employers' inherent animus towards protected groups.
Discrimination based on a perceived disability is closer to age
discrimination in that an employer discriminates on the basis of a
disability due to ill-informed stereotypes about the disabled
worker's capabilities. Unlike age, a disability is closer to race or
gender because the disability is unique to an individual, whereas
everyone will age. Therefore, given the nature of disabilities, the
argument that we should treat disability discrimination in a way
that is analogous to race and gender discrimination is a strong one.
Congress can treat disability and Title VII discrimination
analogously by extending a mixed-motives proof structure to ADA
disparate treatment plaintiffs.
Congress enacted the ADA to ensure "a disabled individual's
right to operate on equal terms within the workplace" and to
eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities.' 62 if
Congress wishes to achieve these goals, then it should extend a
mixed-motives framework to ADA disparate treatment claims. To
fail to do so would lead to the same harmful consequences as
stripping ADEA disparate treatment plaintiffs of a mixed-motives
analysis: (1) it would under-deter disability discrimination; (2) it
would allow discriminators to get away with discrimination; and
(3) it would unfairly allocate a windfall to defendants.' 63
Ultimately, Congress should stop Gross from engulfing other
anti-discrimination laws such as the ADA. If Congress is serious
about eradicating discrimination in the work place, then it should
not favor one type of victim over another. Cases like Serwatka
161. See, e.g., Kentucky Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 146-47 (2008);
Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 586-89 (2004); Hazen Paper
Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
162. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 85 (2002); PGA Tour,
Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 674 (2001).
163. See discussion supra Part III.A. 1.
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threaten to create this type of favoritism by placing ADA claimants
at a judicial disadvantage when compared with Title VII claimants.
2. Smith: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back
Smith was a positive step in halting employment discrimination
law from spiraling further away from its core. The case, however,
does not mark the end of Gross's possible expansion to Title VII
retaliation claims. Xerox vigorously urged that Gross dictates a
Title VII retaliation plaintiff, like an ADEA plaintiff, must prove
his claim using a but-for standard of causation.' 6 4 What is to stop
defendants in other circuits from asserting an argument similar to
Xerox's argument? With Gross in mind, astute defense lawyers
will continue to assert Xerox's argument whenever an employee
brings a Title VII retaliation claim using a mixed-motives
framework.
Smith's forceful dissent is also indicative of a judicial impulse
to extend Gross's limited amendment and ordinary meaning
arguments to all statutes other than Title VII's discrimination
provision. 165 Several district court decisions illustrate this impulse
through their willingness to extend Gross to Title VII retaliation
claims.16 6 In Awand v. National City Bank, an Ohio district court
refused to extend the 1991 Act framework to a Title VII retaliation
claim, choosing instead to analyze the case using McDonnell
Douglas.167 The Awand court reached its conclusion by looking to
appellate court decisions that used a limited amendment argument
to deny Title VII retaliation plaintiffs access to the 1991 Act
framework.168 In Beckford v. Geithner, the D.C. District Court
cited Gross approvingly, stating that the ordinary meaning
argument prohibited the 1991 Act's application to Title VII
retaliation claims.169 These cases illustrate the judicial impulse to
164. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 328 (5th Cir. 2010).
165. See also Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 (7th
Cir. 2010); Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 526 (7th Cir. 2010).
166. See Awand v. Nat'l City Bank, No. 1:09-CV-00261, 2010 WL 1524411,
slip op. at 10-11 (N.D. Ohio April 15, 2010); Beckford v. Geithner, 661 F.
Supp. 2d 17, 25 (D.D.C. 2009).
167. Awand, 2010 WL 1524411 at 10.
168. Id. at 10 n.4.
169. 661 F. Supp. 2d at 25 n.3 (".. . [T]he reasoning of the Supreme Court in
Gross . . . finding that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act does not
authorize mixed-motives claims on the ground that the statute only prohibits
discrimination 'because of an individual's age, appears applicable to the anti-
retaliation provision of Title VII, which also prohibits discrimination only
'because' the employee has engaged in a protected act.") (internal citations
omitted).
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latch onto Gross's arguments. While Smith made strides in
stemming the tide of Gross, Awand and Beckford illustrate how
Gross's ill effects will continue to threaten Title VII retaliation
plaintiffs until Congress acts.
Prior to Gross, many appellate courts adopted a limited
amendment argument to hold that the 1991 Act framework did not
apply to Title VII retaliation claims. Instead of saying that the
limited amendment argument barred the application of a mixed-
motives framework to Title VII's retaliation provision, these courts
continued to apply Price Waterhouse.170 Will these Circuits-the
First, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh-like the Fifth Circuit in
Smith, adhere to their prior precedent, or will these Circuits adopt
Gross and say that the mixed-motives framework, in the context of
Title VII retaliation claims, is dead? Regardless of the answer to this
question, these Circuits' pre-Gross approach creates a chink in the
armor of the limited amendment argument. These decisions
illustrate that courts can easily use the limited amendment argument
to reach the opposite conclusion of Gross. Courts can use the limited
amendment argument to validate the continuing viability of Price
Waterhouse, rather than using it to create a complete bar on mixed-
motives. Despite Gross's holding, the limited amendment argument
should not sound the death knell of mixedmotives for all anti-
discrimination laws not amended in 1991.
Allowing Gross to extend to Title VII's retaliation provision
would be undesirable because of the interconnectedness of Title
VII's discrimination and retaliation provisions.171 Anti-
170. Speedy v. Rexnord Corp., 243 F.3d 397, 401-02 (7th Cir. 2001) (stating
that Price Waterhouse, not the 1991 Act framework applies to Title VII
retaliation claims); Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir.
2001) ("Although the 1991 Act overruled in part the mixed-motive defense with
respect to discrimination suits based on race, color, sex, and national origin, this
circuit and other circuits have held that the mixed-motive defense is still
available in retaliation cases."); Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d
848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000) ("We ... conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did
not change the . . . Price Waterhouse analysis applicable to retaliation claims
under the Act.. . ."); McNutt v. Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ill., 141 F.3d 706, 709
(7th Cir. 1998) ("It is enough here that Congress clearly stated its decision to
overrule Price Waterhouse only with respect to claims under § 2000e-2(m) and
did not make a similar provision for retaliation claims under § 2000e-3(a).");
Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 933 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Section 107 on
its face does not apply to retaliation claims. It amends only 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2,
which prohibits discrimination . . . and does not mention § 2000e-3, the
retaliation provision."); Tanca v. Nordberg, 98 F.3d 680, 685 (1st Cir. 1996)
("We also believe that the Price Waterhouse rule does apply to mixed motive
retaliation claims.").
171. "The primary purpose of anti-retaliation provisions in any employment
statute is to secure the underlying rights promised by the statute by protecting
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discrimination laws contain retaliation provisions to protect the
fundamental rights promised by their discrimination
counterparts. 72 Therefore, courts should not require a higher
burden of persuasion in a Title VII retaliation claim than in a
discrimination claim when the two types of claims "do not pose
different consideration[s] for causation." 7 3 Courts should strive to
make anti-discrimination laws' discrimination and retaliation
provisions work in unison. Gross's spread to Title VII's retaliation
provision would prevent it from ensuring the underlying rights
promised by the discrimination provision and cause the two
provisions to work in a discordant fashion.
Gross has expanded more readily to the ADA than Title VII's
retaliation provision. Most courts apply Price Waterhouse to Title
VII retaliation claims, and the provision seems more resistant than
the ADA to Gross's limited amendment argument. The fact that
Gross has not yet spread to Title VII's retaliation provision should
not, however, prevent Congress from acting preemptively. The fact
that Smith did not extend Gross to Title VII's retaliation provision
does not mean that other circuits will act similarly. If Congress
should halt the spread of Gross to the ADA, then it should also
preemptively halt the spread of Gross to Title VII's retaliation
provision.
C. Gross Beyond the Context ofEmployment Discrimination Law
Gross's holding is not limited to disparate treatment claims
brought under federal employment discrimination statutes. While
Gross's immediate impact is on disparate treatment claims in the
context of employment discrimination, the decision, nevertheless,
threatens to expand and affect all disparate treatment claims under
federal law. The logical extrapolation of the limited amendment
argument is that any statute without a specific standard of
causation will necessitate a but-for standard for liability.
Lower courts can easily apply Gross and reach this conclusion
in disparate treatment claims brought under employment
discrimination laws. Courts can make this logical jump so easily
because the only statute that Congress amended to add a mixed-
those who assert or assist in the implementation of these rights." Harper, supra
note 14, at 137.
172. Id. ("Anti-retaliation provisions are not less important than are anti-
discrimination provisions, as the former typically are adopted to protect the
latter.").
173. Id.
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motives analysis in 1991 was Title VII.174 If courts read Gross's
limited amendment argument literally, then the only anti-
discrimination statute with a mixed-motives framework is Title
VII. According to Gross, unless Congress expressly amends the
ADEA, the ADA, and other anti-retaliation provisions, the limited
amendment argument dictates that Title VII is the sole statute with
a mixed-motives framework. The Fifth Circuit recognized and
anticipated this conclusion, stating: "The Supreme Court's opinion
in Gross . . . raises the question of whether the mixed-motive
framework is available to plaintiffs alleging discrimination outside
of the Title VII framework."17 5
Courts may take Gross's limited amendment argument even
one step further by extending it outside of employment
discrimination law. The Seventh Circuit, for example, stated that
Gross holds that "unless a statute provides otherwise . . .
demonstrating but-for causation is part of the plaintiffs burden in
all suits under federal law."'7 Such statements are indicative of the
limited amendment argument's expansive sweep.
Williams v. District of Columbia is a concrete example of
Gross's extension outside of employment discrimination law.177 in
Williams, the D.C. Circuit Court applied Gross to hold that a
plaintiff bringing a disparate treatment claim under the Federal
Jury Improvement Act must prove his claim using a but-for
standard of causation.' 7 8 Williams stated that the Act's "because
of' language necessitates a but-for standard and bars a mixed-
motives standard of causation.'7 9 Williams is illustrative of Gross's
ultimate danger, which is that the decision, if not overturned, will
reach beyond the boundaries of employment discrimination.
Gross has primarily had an adverse effect on employment
discrimination law, but this decision will have similar effects on
other types of disparate treatment claims. If Congress is not
motivated to overturn Gross based on its harmful effects on
employment discrimination law, then the fact that Gross may
envelope other types of disparate treatment claims should nudge
Congress in the direction of overturning this decision.
174. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1 (1991); H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2
(1991).
175. Crouch v. J.C. Penny Corp. Inc., 337 Fed. App'x 399, 402 n.1 (5th Cir.
2009).
176. Fairley v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525-26 (7th Cir. 2010).
177. 646 F. Supp. 2d 103 (D.D.C. 2009).
178. Id. at 109.
179. Id. ("Unlike Title VII, [the Juror Act's] text does not provide that a




D. The Theoretical and Practical Reasons for a Mixed-Motives
Framework
Before advocating a congressional response to Gross, an initial
question that one may ask is, "Why favor a mixed-motives
analysis?" The answer is there are theoretical and practical reasons
why a mixed-motives framework mirroring the 1991 Act is
favorable. Gross and its progeny render mixed-motives
inapplicable to ADEA, ADA, and potentially Title VII retaliation
claims. 80 In so doing, these decisions jeopardize one of the
fundamental goals of employment discrimination law-deterrence.
Therefore, in order to deter discriminatory conduct, the law
should allow disparate treatment plaintiffs to proceed under a
mixed-motives framework for several theoretical reasons. First, the
employer caused the uncertainty about whether an impermissible
criterion played a role in the adverse employment action.!8 1 Justice
O'Connor articulated this concern, stating that a mixed-motives
analysis is apt "in cases . . . where the employer has created
uncertainty as to causation by knowingly giving substantial weight
to an impermissible criterion." 82 The truth is that the employer is
the alleged wrongdoer, and as such, the employer should bear the
risk that it will not be able to untangle its permissible from its
183impermissible motives.
A second theoretical reason for favoring a mixed-motives
analysis is that the defendant has the best access to the evidence of
its motives for fuing an employee. 184 Human resource files and the
recollections of supervisors and co-employees will often contain
probative value as to an employer's subjective motivations in taking
180. Katz, supra note 5, at 883 ("Gross departs from these principles,
requiring the plaintiff to shoulder the entire burden without regard for the
difficulty of proving but-for causation, the fact that most of the evidence on the
issue is under the control of the defendant, or the fact that the defendant has
engaged in wrongdoing. The Gross standard is therefore normatively
problematic."). Gross is "normatively problematic" when applied to the ADEA,
the ADA, and Title VII's retaliation provisions for the same reasons.
181. Id.
182. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261-62 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring).
183. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) ("The
employer is a wrongdoer; he has acted out of a motive that is declared
illegitimate by the statute. It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of
legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the
risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own
wrongdoing.").
184. Katz, supra note 5, at 883.
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an adverse employment action.'8 Therefore, since the employee,
who is the alleged victim of discrimination, cannot easily access this
evidence, fairness dictates that the burden of persuasion should, at
some point, shift to the defendant-employer.
Finally, the defendant has the best information about an
nondiscriminatory reason that may have informed its actions.V
Since the employer has the best access to evidence, it will also
have the best information about any nondiscriminatory reasons for
an adverse employment action. Given the employer's access to this
information, the employer should have the opportunity to show
that it acted in a nondiscriminatory manner. This theoretical
consideration favors the employer and acts as a counterbalance to
favoring the employee because of the employer's ease of access to
evidence.
In addition to these theoretical underpinnings, several practical
considerations should sway Congress in the direction of favoring a
mixed-motives analysis for all disparate treatment claims. One
mixed-motives structure would make the law easier to understand
for employers, employees, lawyers, judges, and juries.18 In
conjunction with this sinplification, a single structure would
increase judicial efficiency.
Finally, having a single mixed-motives analysis would help
instill public confidence in anti-discrimination laws.190 If the goal
of employment discrimination law is to put people similarly
situated on an equal playing field, then the public may not
understand why one law should have a more favorable proof
185. While discovery mechanisms are available to disparate treatment
plaintiffs, the law should favor burden-shifting over discovery for several
reasons: (1) probing an employer's subjective state of mind is difficult; (2) the
employer is in a superior position to know its processes and who is responsible
for making employment decisions; and (3) the new heightened federal pleading
standards often prevent plaintiffs from advancing to the discovery phase of
litigation. See supra note 6. Discovery, therefore, is an inadequate procedural
mechanism for sifting out an employer's subjective intent from potential
evidence.
186. Katz, supra note 5, at 883.
187. Id.
188. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 691-92.
189. See Katz, supra note 13, at 643-44 ("Doctrinal confusion is expensive
and inefficient. Parties often engage in gamesmanship and protracted litigation
merely to determine the applicable framework. The uncertainty over the
applicable framework often prevents early settlement, further increasing the
costs for litigants (as well as the courts). And such a state of affairs breeds
cynicism about the law in this area, as it suggests that outcomes depend more on
technicalities than on merits of a particular case.").
190. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 691-92.
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structure than another.1'9 Esoteric and theoretical differences
between certain types of discrimination may exist,192 but the public
may not understand, or care, about these differences. Employment
discrimination law, as it now stands, leaves the public wondering
why an African-American or female worker should be more
protected than an older or disabled worker.
As Gross and its progeny expand the gyre of employment
discrimination law, these theoretical and practical underpinnings
will become more pertinent. Gross threatens to eradicate the
mixed-motives analysis in all disparate treatment claims except
Title VII discrimination. Gross has not simply caused employment
discrimination law to become more confusing. Rather, it has
pushed this body of law to the brink of being altered for the worse.
These theoretical and practical reasons for favoring a mixed-
motives analysis are just one more reason why Congress must act
to pull this area of the law away from this dangerous precipice.
IV. THE PROTECTING OLDER WORKERS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION
ACT: A New Center
Congess stands poised to reel in the expanding gyre Gross
created. Congress recognizes that "Gross . . . has eroded .. . [a]
long held understanding of consistent interpretation and
circumvented well established precedents."' 94 This erosion and
circumvention must stop, especially now that Gross is affecting
other anti-discrimination statutes and disparate treatment claims.
The Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act
(POWAD Act) is a step in the right direction for employment
discrimination law. There are, however, several flaws with the Act
that Congress must address, or Congress, not the Court, will cause
employment discrimination law to spiral out of control. The
POWAD Act, if repaired, has the potential to provide employment
discrimination law with a solid core, a veritable Rosetta Stone for
judges and lawyers to point to as a guide to proving disparate
treatment claims.
Commentators have long espoused the idea that employment
discrimination law needs to be unified in order to be more sensible.
191. Id.
192. For an example of the esoteric nature of arguments distinguishing
different types discrimination see Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things is
Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to Racism In Employment
Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 839 (2004).
193. See Protecting Older Workers Against Discrimination Act, H.R. 3721,
11Ith Cong. (2009).
194. Id. § 2(a)(3).
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With each progression in the history of disparate treatment proof
structures, these cries for uniformity have grown louder.195 After
Gross, these cries reached a crescendo.' 96 This Comment joins the
chorus, arguing that the spread of Gross into the context of the
ADA and possibly Title VII retaliation makes the case for
congressional reform more urgent. 197 Congress no longer should
act, but rather it must act to establish a center for this confused area
of the law.
The POWAD Act proposes to make several important changes
to disparate treatment claims brought under the ADEA. The latest
version of the Act states that its purpose is to apply the 1991 Act
framework to the ADEA and other anti-discrimination and anti-
retaliation laws.' 98 The Act's operative provision overturns Gross
and applies the 1991 Act framework to the ADEA.199 The Act also
eradicates the direct/circumstantial evidence dividing line with
respect to the ADEA by allowing an ADEA plaintiff to prove his
claim using any "evidence sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact
to conclude that a violation occurred."200
The Act's most important change, however, is a catchall
provision that states that the Act is applicable to "any Federal law
forbidding employment discrimination" and "any law ... forbidding
other retaliation against an individual for engaging in, or interfering
with, any federally protected activity including the exercise of any
right established by Federal law." 01 This provision is a game
changer because it extends the 1991 Act framework to the ADA and
Title VII's retaliation provision. With this one inconspicuous
provision, Congress can erase all the patchwork solutions to
employment discrimination law by allowing one mixed-motives
proof structure-the 1991 Act framework-to govern all disparate
treatment claims.
195. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13, at 693; Corbett, supra note 10, at
115-16; Katz, supra note 5, at 888-89; Harper, supra note 14, at 144: Katz,
supra note 2; Katz, supra note 13, at 680; Prenkert, supra note 14, at 560-64.
196. See Corbett, Babbling, supra note 13; Harper, supra note 14; Katz,
supra note 5.
197. See discussion supra Parts III.A-D.
198. H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2009) (stating the purpose of the Act is
"to ensure that the standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other anti-discrimination
and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the standard for making such a
proof under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including amendments
made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.").
199. Id. §§ 3(g)(1)-(g)(2). This provision also extends the 1991 Act's same-
decision, damages-limiting defense to ADEA defendants.
200. Id. § 3(g)(3).
201. Id §§ 3(g)(5)(B), 3(g)(5)(C).
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Despite its beneficial qualities, Congress should not pass the
POWAD Act in its present form. The current version of the Act
would perpetuate flaws that have riddled employment
discrimination law for the past 20 years. The Act's flaws are that it
does not expressly overrule Price Waterhouse and that it maintains
McDonnell Douglas without specifying this framework's
applicability. 202
Congress states that its purpose in passing the POWAD Act is
to make the standard of proof for all anti-discrimination and anti-
retaliation claims no different than the standard of "the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 including amendments made by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Q03 Through this statement of intent, Congress
wishes to al all anti-discrimination laws with the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Congress, however, still refuses to directly overturn
Price Waterhouse. Congress's inaction leaves the door open for
arguments that Price Waterhouse has continuing viability in non-
1991 Act disparate treatment cases. Given Congress's disapproval
of Price Waterhouse in 1991, the sensible conclusion is that
Congress would not want to preserve this framework through any
new act.205 Congress, therefore, should explicitly overrule Price
Waterhouse and clearly state that only the 1991 Act framework is
applicable under the POWAD Act.
The POWAD Act's major flaw is that it preserves McDonnell
Douglas without giving guidance as to when this framework is
applicable. The Act states that every proof structure shall be
available to an ADEA plaintiff "including the evidentiary
framework set forth in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. . ."206 Though
this provision, Congress preserves McDonnell Douglas without
providing any guidance as to when plaintiffs should proceed under
the 1991 Act or under the pretext analysis. Congress, by preserving
McDonnell Douglas, puts employment discrimination law back
where it was post-Desert Palace, with two frameworks and no
guidance as to when plaintiffs should proceed under one or the
other.207
The POWAD Act is beneficial because it overturns Gross and
ultimately stops employment discrimination law from spiraling
further away from its core. The Act, however, is a regression to the
post-2003 Desert Palace landscape. The current version of the Act
202. See id. §§ 2(b), 3(g)(4).
203. Id. § 2(b) (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. See background supra Part II.A.
206. H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 3(g)(4) (2009).
207. See background supra Part II.B.
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will put employment discrimination law back in the untenable
position of having several proof structures and no guiding
principles governing their application. If Congress were to pass the
current version of the POWAD Act, it would simultaneously move
employment discrimination law one step forward and two steps
back.
Thus, Congress should revise the POWAD Act and clearly
state that the 1991 Act framework governs and that Price
Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas are no longer viable. If
Congress wishes to preserve McDonnell Douglas, then it should
expressly state when this framework is applicable. Given the
superiority and appropriateness of the mixed-motives analysis in
employment discrimination law,208 Congress should apply the
1991 Act framework to all disparate treatment claims. By making
these changes before passing the Act, Congress will finally
alleviate the problems of Desert Palace and Gross.
CONCLUSION
The history of proof structures for disparate treatment claims in
employment discrimination law has been a perplexing, at some
times nonsensical, journey. Gross and its progeny may cause
employment discrimination law to spiral completely out of control
and away from its burden-shifting center. The further Gross causes
employment discrimination law to drift from this core, the more in
jeopardy the policy goals of victim compensation and deterrence
will become. The expansion of Gross to encompass other anti-
discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes is the decision's worst
consequence. If Gross's ill-effects were not enough to compel
Congress to legislate, then the way in which its holding has and
threatens to spread should provide Congress with the extra impetus
to stem the tide of this regrettable decision. Ultimately, Serwatka
and Smith illustrate the undesirable consequences of Gross and act
as further illustrations of the need for one mixed-motives proof
structure.
Generally, a mixed-motives analysis mirroring the 1991 Act
framework is the most appropriate method of proving the
subjective realm of an employer's discriminatory intent. Gross's
willingness to strip ADEA plaintiffs of a mixed-motives analysis
makes a plaintiffs task in proving age discrimination daunting.
When lower courts expansively apply Gross, they place potential
ADA and Title VII retaliation plaintiffs in an equally tenuous
position. If Congress is serious about combating all forms of
208. See discussion supra Part III.D.
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employment discrimination, then it should not endorse proof
structures that put plaintiffs at such serious disadvantages.
The ultimate solution to the proof structure problem is for
Congress to pass an amended version of the POWAD Act. The Act
is beneficial because it overturns Gross and seemingly applies the
1991 Act framework to all anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation
laws. But employment discrimination law cannot continue to
advance with multiple proof structures and no guidance on when
each structure is applicable. Congress, therefore, should amend the
POWAD Act to abolish the excess proof structures. If Congress
passes the Act without these amendments, it will move
employment discrimination law one step forward and two steps
back into the post-Desert Palace landscape.
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